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3INTRODUCTION
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and subsequent meddling in Ukraine does not
constitute a game-changer. It is just a reminder that at least since the war with
Georgia in 2008 Russia has been and still is playing the same game: a “game of
zones”, aimed at (re)establishing an exclusive sphere of influence. Many of us Euro-
peans had forgotten that, or had pushed it to the back of our minds, preferring to
believe that we were not engaged in a zero-sum game in our eastern neighbourhood.
While we were dealing with Ukraine, we tended also to forget the crises still going on
in our southern neighbourhood, in Libya, Mali, Syria and now Iraq. Spilling over from
Syria, extremist militias may establish their own “zone” in the Middle East, which
would de-stabilize the entire region. In order to prevent that game-changer from
materializing, another game-changer may be necessary: a rapprochement with Iran.
Europe must assume responsibility for security in its entire neighbourhood, both east
and south. The challenge is great – but so are Europe’s means.
Sven Biscop1
1 Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop is director of the Europe in the World programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for
International Relations and teaches at Ghent University and at the College of Europe in Bruges. The author
warmly thanks Jo Coelmont, Daniel Fiott, Marc Franco, Alexander Mattelaer and Bert Schoofs for their
feedback on the first drafts of this paper. They gave him confidence to proceed in this complex matter,
though not the capacity to avoid all errors, which remain entirely his own. 
5TROUBLE IN THE EAST
The European Union’s (EU) hope was that the countries of Zwischeneuropa, wedged
in between itself and Russia, would be able to make their own choices, instead of
Brussels or Moscow choosing for them. If they would choose to develop close ties
with us, we would gladly oblige, on the condition that they would undertake
economic reforms and commit to improve democracy, respect for human rights and
the rule of law. But the EU never asked that they would sever relations with Russia.
Russia however does not see the world through this lens. And because a win-win
situation requires that both sides perceive a benefit, we were engaged in a zero-sum
game, whether we wanted to or not.
Those who deride Europe for failing to understand this, especially in the US, are not
entirely wrong. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was simply not political
enough. Warnings were issued by EU Member States’ embassies and from within the
EU apparatus itself (notably the European External Action Service or EEAS) that
appearances were deceptive and the signing of the agreement with Ukraine would
not proceed that smoothly. Implementing its far-reaching stipulations was in fact
incompatible with the nature of the regime. Pushing on regardless, we set in motion
a chain of events that led to an (itself unpredictable) Russian overreaction. Thus we
learned about the geopolitical implications of technical cooperation, export of norms
and trade relations the hard way.
Just a few years ago however, in 2006-2008, the Europeans prevented the US from
making the same mistake by resisting NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia.
Surely that move would not have remained without a Russian reaction either.
Neither Washington nor Brussels seems to have learned very much from that
episode. In fact, at the time Ukraine itself eventually declined to join NATO. That
ought to have taught us that when a country itself is too divided over its own future,
pushing it to make an untimely choice is unwise, for it is bound to increase domestic
tensions.
And those tensions are easily exploited by the country’s other neighbour, Russia,
seeking to advance its pawns in the game of zones. Russia is acting more out of weak-
ness than out of strength, however. Rather than executing a master plan, Putin
seems to be making it up as he goes along. He supported Ukrainian President Yanu-
kovich to the very end, probably because he did not see an alternative way of safe-
guarding Russian influence. Then Yanukovich fled the country, either without prior
warning, which means Russia lost control of events, or with Russian connivance, in
which case Moscow gravely miscalculated. For immediately the opposition came to
power, which naturally turned to its western neighbour for support. At a stroke,
Putin lost most of his influence in Ukraine.
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The subsequent annexation of the Crimea can be seen as an overreaction. The penin-
sula’s only strategic asset is the naval base, the continued Russian use of which the
new Ukrainian government guaranteed right away. But it is typical of a bully to grab
by force even what he could get by asking politely, because that’s what the bully’s
reputation depends on. The legitimacy of the regime is based to a great extent on the
pretence that Russia remains a great power on a par with the US and China. The
easiest way of maintaining that mirage is by acting as a spoiler in the west, simply
because we are such polite company. It is difficult to imagine Putin taking similar risks
vis-à-vis China, which would likely react with somewhat less circumspection than
Europe and the US. But to take on a bigger part than that of spoiler, be it a very
irritating one, Russia no longer has the means.
The real game-changer for us in Europe is that the US has made the same assessment
and has reoriented its strategy accordingly. Seen from Washington there is only one
strategic competitor: China, hence the “pivot” or rebalancing of the focus of US
strategy towards Asia. Of course “events, dear boy, events” will continue to pull the
US in other directions. But a great power will also aim to shape events in priority
areas – China and Asia are that priority for the US today. The not so implicit message
to Europe is perfectly logical: we must assume a lot more responsibility for security
in our own neighbourhood. The “European Reassurance Initiative” that President
Obama announced in early June 2014, asking Congress for $1 billion to temporarily
deploy additional American forces to Eastern Europe, organize exercises and train
allies and partners, is meant to underscore this message. Rather than a reversal of
the pivot, it says to Europeans, in the run-up to the NATO summit in early September:
shame on you, for you ought to be doing this yourself. The more capable Europe is,
the more safely the US can focus on Asia; in that sense, the pivot hinges on Europe.
NATO’s Article 5 is there to guarantee, through conventional and nuclear deterrence,
that our own territory is not under threat. As indeed it is not, for impressive though
Russian operations in the Crimea may have been from a military point of view, taking
on a NATO or EU Member State is another thing entirely.
7EVEN MORE TROUBLE IN THE SOUTH
The European burden of responsibility does not just include our eastern periphery,
but our southern neighbourhood as well. Successive crises eclipsed each other in
Libya, Mali and Syria until now all eyes are on Ukraine. But the violence in the former
three countries has far from abated, and a grave crisis has now erupted in Iraq as
well.
At first sight, the ENP seems to have suffered from the same weakness in the east
and in the south, which led to the EU being overtaken by the Arab Spring and the
crisis in Ukraine. A focus on the “low politics” of economic and technical cooperation,
to the detriment of the “high politics” of diplomacy and defence; a wide range of
ongoing activities, but without a strategy linking these to well-defined political ends.
In the east “low politics” masked the actual absence of an EU strategy, a conse-
quence of the EU’s conscious avoidance of any fundamental debate on how to deal
with Russia, for fear of bringing out the divisions between Member States. Activities
under the flag of the Eastern Partnership went on without it being clear which rela-
tionship the EU eventually aspired to with the six countries concerned. Unfortu-
nately, activity is no substitute for strategy: if you don’t know what your objectives
are, even the most diverse array of activities is unlikely to achieve them.
In the south however “low politics” masked a “high politics” approach by the EU –
but one that was very much at odds with the rhetoric of the ENP. Here not so much
the absence of strategy as the discrepancy between declared and actual strategy
handicapped the EU. In practice, the ambitious ENP agenda of stimulating neigh-
bouring governments to equally provide for all their citizens in terms of security,
prosperity and freedom was abandoned in favour of a short-term focus on energy,
illegal migration, and terrorism. Whichever regime was ready to cooperate with the
EU in these areas could count on our support, quite regardless of the human rights
situation. The former colonial powers’ special relationships with most countries of
the region did not help. As a result pictures featuring embarrassing embraces with
since ousted dictators can be found of quite a few European leaders. In the east, by
contrast, in spite of the absence of strategy, the EU did adhere much more to its
principles. Compare our attitude vis-à-vis obviously flawed elections in Belarus and
pre-Arab Spring Tunisia: condemnations for the former, congratulations for the
latter.
Had we remained as principled in the south, we would probably not have seen a
speedier or less violent transition, but we would have enjoyed much greater legiti-
macy. In Ukraine demonstrators used their support for the EU’s model of society to
signal their dissatisfaction with Yanukovich. In Tunisia people rose in revolt
demanding exactly what Europe stands for, but they saw the EU as an obstacle rather
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than an ally in their struggle. Because of historical reasons people in our eastern
neighbours can of course connect more easily with Europe than in the south. Less
than in Cold War Poland perhaps but much more than in present-day Egypt, people
in Ukraine can think in terms of a return to Europe and a restoration of the freedom
which they briefly enjoyed and was then taken away from them. In the south, history
inevitably leads people to see Europe as foreign, paternalist or even imperialist.
Having just made a revolution they are loath to accept any outside model. Fortu-
nately that means that other outside powers seeking to increase their presence (the
Gulf States, Russia, China) find it is not a walk-over either. But they are intent on
playing the game of zones and their influence is on the rise.
At the same time even domestic actors who prioritise a religious agenda over the
political, economic and social concerns of the people meet with strong resistance.
One positive conclusion can be drawn therefore. Revolution and protest in both our
eastern and southern neighbourhood have vindicated the core idea of EU foreign
policy (as expressed e.g. in the 2003 European Security Strategy). An equal share in
security, prosperity and freedom is a universal demand and not a European or
western conception; without it, no durable peace and stability are possible. On this
the EU can build to revitalize its strategy for the neighbourhood.
9ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT?
The start of a new Commission, including a new High Representative, is the perfect
opportunity to make a new start in the neighbourhood. Fortunately, nobody seems
to doubt any longer, as was long the case, that the EU should set priorities in function
of its vital interests. They are obviously at stake in the neighbourhood: preventing
spill-over of security threats to our territory, ensuring trade routes and energy
supply, managing migration and refugees, combating trafficking of humans, arms
and drugs, maintaining international law, safeguarding the autonomy of our deci-
sion-making.
Europe cannot keep quiet therefore, but that does not mean that Europe too should
start playing the game of zones. The best way of preserving our interests is not by
attempting to bring our neighbours under our control. As Russia is learning in
Ukraine, even if part of the population supports you, you will inevitably antagonise
others, which is a recipe for perennial instability. Our interests are better served by
empowering our neighbours to make their own choices, and to offer mutually bene-
ficial partnership if they also, but not exclusively, choose to cooperate with us. We
do not need our neighbours to look up to us, but we don’t want them to look away
from us either – that would be very harmful for our interests. Empowerment starts
with domestic stability, which starts with integrating all citizens in the political arena,
guaranteeing their security, and their share in the wealth of the country. We
certainly do not need to abandon the core idea of the European Security Strategy
therefore.
But we do require new regional strategies on how to bring this grand strategy into
practice. Strategies, plural: the notion that a single Neighbourhood Policy can fit all
of our neighbours has been proved wrong. The dynamics in the east (geographically
and culturally in Europe, but also within the ambit of a power with irredentist
designs, Russia) and the south (in Africa and Asia, where multiple powers compete
for influence) are just too different. At the same time, the EU has come to realise that
“the neighbours of the neighbours” are often as crucial to our interests. Five partially
overlapping and strongly interrelated areas are of vital importance to European secu-
rity: the eastern neighbourhood, the Mediterranean, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa,
and the Gulf.
In diplomacy, symbols matter. The EU would do well to gradually phase out the ENP
brand, which rightly or wrongly has become associated with failure, in favour of an
Eastern, Mediterranean, Sahel, Horn of Africa and Gulf Policy. These policies should
be issue-based and thus geographically overlapping. The EU has a tendency, manifest
also in the ENP, to see the world through the artificial geographic divides that are but
its own creation and do not always reflect reality on the ground. Different issues
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generate different regional dynamics, hence the EU should be flexible and approach
the same country in the context of different regional policies according to the issue
at hand. That of course requires prioritization and strong coordination between poli-
cies, in order to avoid that neighbouring countries would be confronted with contra-
dictory expectations.
11
AN AMBITIOUS LONG-TERM SECURITY PROVIDER
Before any new long-term regional policies can be put in place, the EU must address
the ongoing crises in its neighbourhood.
To start with we must make it clear that we do consider the security of this broad
region to be our responsibility. Not because that is what the US expects from us, but
in the first place because our comprehensive regional policies will not be credible if
the impression persists, as in the past, that our engagement ends where hard secu-
rity problems begin. Europe must be the first-line security provider in its own neigh-
bourhood. Whenever a security problem arises, the EU must take the lead, initiate a
response, and forge a coalition to deliver it. In many instances a diplomatic response
will be called for, at which the High Representative and the EEAS have already proven
to be proficient (on Kosovo and Iran e.g.), supplemented as required with sticks and
carrots from the comprehensive EU toolkit (trade, development, SSR, sanctions etc.).
But the EU must also display the ability and the will to use force, first of all as a cred-
ible deterrent that will enhance the effectiveness of its diplomacy. Actual military
intervention is the last resort when vital interests and the responsibility to protect
cannot otherwise be upheld. Even if the EU would formally declare the broader
neighbourhood a security priority, at the level of grand strategy, whether or not to
intervene in a specific crisis will always depend on an ad hoc cost-benefit calculation.
What positive effects could intervention achieve, but which negative fall-out might it
generate and which risks would our forces run? Crucial to the military success of
recent interventions (in Libya and Mali) is that a major part of the population
welcomed them.
It will in any case be our decision. As a consequence of the pivot, the US will no longer
take the initiative in our place but will look to Europeans to take charge. The EU
evidently is the best forum through which they can assume this comprehensive secu-
rity role. If in a specific crisis Europeans decide to take military action, they will of
course call upon a Member State or NATO to provide the command and control for
a European-led operation, through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
or NATO, depending on the circumstances. Assuming our responsibilities has capa-
bility implications. Europeans must drastically step up military cooperation and inte-
gration through the CSDP to enable them to fulfil the Headline Goal (deploying at
corps level or up to 60,000 troops) in the broad neighbourhood over and above any
ongoing operations – that would be a real deterrent and strategic reserve. Further-
more, they must aspire to be able to deploy in this region relying on their own
enabling capabilities (air-to-air refuelling, intelligence etc.) rather than continue to
be dependent on the US, thus freeing up American assets for deployment elsewhere.
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AND A CRISIS MANAGER: IN THE EAST
These long-term security obligations provide the framework for the EU’s short-term
crisis management.
In the East, the EU actually has responded pretty adequately to the outbreak of the
Ukraine crisis: adopting sanctions to signal its dissatisfaction with the annexation of
the Crimea, keeping further sanctions in reserve to warn Putin against similar military
incursion in mainland Ukraine, providing economic support to the Ukrainian govern-
ment and helping to organize the presidential elections, and engaging in high-level
diplomacy. Indeed, Obama aligned himself with this approach in his Brussels speech
on 26 March 2014, putting paid to rather more belligerent utterings in some Amer-
ican quarters. Of course, EU decisions were preceded by difficult debates between
Member States, but too often we allow these initial divisions to overshadow the
outcome. They are inherent to decision-making in any actor, the only difference
being that usually debates in the EU are out in the open as opposed to those between
the State Department, the Pentagon and the National Security Council.
This policy is helped by the fact that Putin too seems to have noticed that in eastern
Ukraine there may be a lot of dissatisfaction with rule from Kiev, but it is neither as
massive as (it apparently is) in the Crimea nor does it necessarily equate with a wish
to join Russia. Unlike in the Crimea therefore, pushing things to extremes may lead
to a bloody and protracted civil war (as civil wars usually are) in which Putin likely
prefers not to be involved. Russia may in fact have more interest in keeping Ukraine
together but weak, which creates opportunities to wield influence nationally, rather
than in splitting off further parts, which would cut it off completely from the
Western-oriented country that would remain.2
That also implies that the EU and the US should aid Ukraine to build up its armed
forces, but with the objective of maintaining a presence of the central government
throughout the country – not to try and resolve the issue by force. That would only
fuel internecine violence, which could tempt Russia in turn to intervene militarily
anyway, bound as it has itself by its statements about protection of Russians every-
where. The people who stand to lose from civil war are the Ukrainians. The EU should
rather continue its diplomatic engagement to try and forge a consensus on a federal
solution for Ukraine that can satisfy all Ukrainians, including in the East of the
country, which can therefore also be a face-saving way out for Russia. That may
require adopting more severe economic sanctions though, to ensure that Russian
probing stays below a certain threshold. The EU’s resolve may be tested sooner
rather than later…
2 Tony Wood, “Back from the Edge? On the Situation in Ukraine”. In: London Review of Books, Vol. 36, 2014,
No. 11, pp. 37-38. 
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In the end, the outcome might be very advantageous for the EU, except than that we
will likely be the one having to pay for it for a long time to come: the gradual stabili-
zation of a more democratic Ukraine, free to build constructive relations with all of
its neighbours. The economic and political challenge is huge though.
The question that we should ask ourselves is: are we willing to establish as close
relations and spend as much treasure on the other countries of the Eastern Partner-
ship? If they so desire, of course. In the case of Moldova a positive answer seems
already guaranteed from both sides; as regards Belarus the question does not now
pose itself. But what about the South Caucasus? What are their aspirations, how far
are we willing to go to meet them, and how can we avoid another clash with Russia?
Putin may have damaged his own long-term interests for even those who are inclined
to look to Moscow rather than to Brussels did not count on cessation of territory
being part of the bargain.
What EU policy will not achieve is to return the Crimea to Ukraine. The peninsula will
join South Ossetia, Abkhazia and others in the category of territories whose
proclaimed status we do not recognize but also do not actively attempt to alter. That
is unsatisfactory, but it ought not to be a surprise. The history of international rela-
tions since World War Two shows that the Permanent Five do not wage war against
one another, and that even proxy wars tend to be very costly for all sides. Just as,
earlier in this century, Russia and China protested against but could do little in prac-
tice to end the evidently illegal US invasion and occupation of Iraq, so the balance of
power impels us to live with a Russian Crimea, however much we disapprove.
We have to work with the great powers, simply because they are the great powers.
Their non-obstruction, if not their active cooperation, is needed to advance in other
key areas, such as the negotiations about Syria and Iran, and economic ties are way
too close and important to permanently put at risk. Tempting though some may find
it to revert to Cold War frames, it is imperative to maintain constructive relations.
Issue-based cooperation with all of its “strategic partners”, whenever the EU finds
that it can agree on the way to protect shared interests, is precisely the way of pulling
them into effective and rule-based multilateralism as we see it. Partnership is not
marriage: we do not have to declare our love, but we do have to be able to compart-
mentalize and proceed where we can.
With Russia specifically, energy supply is a crucial dimension of our relations. Putin
will hopefully have provided enough of a scare to have convinced the EU Member
States to finally fully integrate their energy markets and accelerate diversification.
The latter should go beyond diversification in the supply of fossil fuels, for that will
only increase our dependence on other equally undemocratic suppliers. Or it will
makes us rely on fracking by the US, which is extremely damaging for the environ-
ment. The US expects, by the way, that if Europe wants to benefit from American
energy it needs to make an effort itself, i.e. start fracking too. Real diversification
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thus either means more nuclear energy (which is also being suggested from the US
side) or more renewables. Even when we achieve substantial diversification, the EU
would do well to still buy Russian gas. It would then be in a much stronger position,
able to demonstrate its goodwill by continued purchasing from and investment in
the Russian energy sector, which is important for the stability of the country, but in
the knowledge that it could much more easily turn its energy supply around. Our
vulnerability vis-à-vis Russian energy blackmail would thus be much decreased.
17
AS IN THE SOUTH
In recent years, awareness has sharply increased across the EU that security in the
broader southern neighbourhood concerns all of the 28. That does not yet translate,
unfortunately, into a great willingness to act when forceful intervention is required.
In Libya and Mali ad hoc coalitions outside the EU had to take the military lead, at the
initiative of Britain and France, with the EU as such not coming onto the stage until
the follow-up phase. But the EU does now have comprehensive regional strategies
for the Sahel and the Horn, in the implementation of which is has deployed training
and capacity-building missions as well as the naval operation Atalanta. It also has a
border assistance mission in Libya, and its plays a vital role in the diplomatic process
on Syria and on Iran. The challenge now is to consolidate the effects of these actions
and ensure that durable peace and stability result, which may require additional and
ambitious diplomatic initiatives.
What is required first of all though is staying power. The security situation in the
Sahel appears manageable, but fighting in Mali remains ongoing and the EU will have
to sustain its military deployment as well as its economic and financial support for
years to come if the region is not to slide back into major instability. The vastness of
the region is a challenge, but on the other hand even a limited number of major
assets (air support e.g.) in support of local forces can make a difference as insurgents
are mostly but lightly equipped. The EU might wish to consider an additional effort
in this sense, alongside its training missions. In the Horn of Africa, the efforts of years
are finally bearing fruit, but here too a sustained effort is necessary. It will be some
time to come before Somalia is sufficiently stable and prosperous to eradicate the
root causes of piracy. Until that time the EU has no choice but to keep patrolling the
neighbouring waters.
Much more challenging at this moment is the situation in Libya, which is far too
chaotic and dangerous for the border assistance mission to be more than a token
deployment. Unfortunately, gravely deficient follow-up has almost completely
negated the effects of the successful military intervention in 2011. The crisis in Mali
in 2013 has already demonstrated the damage that spill-over from Libya can cause.
Though success is by no means guaranteed, the EU has both the greatest responsi-
bility and the most instruments to work with the Libyan authorities to try and create
a semblance of stability. That implies a much more ambitious role than it is assuming
today.
The gravest crisis is the civil war in Syria, in which any military intervention would
cause more harm than good, and which so far has proved too intractable for the
diplomatic process to achieve anything beyond the destruction of chemical
weapons. At least spill-over of violence to where it was most feared (to Lebanon,
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Jordan and Turkey) has so far been limited, but the risk remains; military action may
yet be called for to prevent it from materializing. In June 2014 however the war spec-
tacularly hit Iraq, when the extreme ISIS group (the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant) that was fighting Assad in Syria took everyone by surprise by capturing large
parts of northern Iraq. Another proof (if more was needed) of the error of invading
Iraq in 2003, everyone is now looking to the US to rescue the government in
Baghdad, including militarily. But Europe can no longer consider this to be just an
American problem, for the stability of the entire Middle East is at stake. Furthermore,
ISIS is exactly the group that many fighters originating from Europe have joined,
which poses great security risks if and when these eventually seek to return.
Meanwhile the EU, together with the UN, the US and Russia, has no option but to
keep putting pressure on all parties in Syria to bring them to the negotiating table. In
view of the stalemate in the civil war, any agreement may have to include a
continued role for Assad, at least in a transitional phase, for it to be workable.
However much we may dislike the idea on principle, the crisis in Iraq has probably
tilted the balance in favour of realism.
The attempt to involve Iran in the Syrian negotiations was very wise and has to be
kept up, for a settlement for Syria has to take into account the proxy war with Saudi
Arabia that is going on. The EU’s role is not to take sides, but to strive for a regional
arrangement in which all find their place. Hence the strategic importance of the
broader negotiations with Iran itself. Care must be taken not to jeopardize the
outcome of these by appearing so eager that Tehran would no longer see a reason
to make many concessions – European energy companies especially are chafing at
the bit. Yet a “normalization” of relations with Iran would be a breakthrough indeed.
“Normalization” can only go so far, in view of the serious human rights issues in Iran
(such as the hanging of homosexuals), though the situation in Saudi-Arabia, the
West’s “ally” in the Gulf is hardly any better. But even a limited shift towards
constructive relations on an issue-by-issue basis would be a game-changer for the
Middle East and the Gulf – and there probably is a much bigger chance of transition
in Iran, which is in many ways a much more open society, than in Saudi Arabia.
Europe could thus try to maintain an equidistant position between Riyadh and
Tehran, further diversify energy supply, and stabilize the Middle East. As the US role
vis-à-vis Iran remains constrained, for domestic political reasons, the EU is best
placed to imagine an ambitious diplomatic scheme to take this forward. Even the US
may step up its engagement, for the crisis in Iraq, where Sunni ISIS fighters are
massacring Shia, is of great concern to Iran as well and has immediately produced
consultation between Washington and Tehran.
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A PARTNER IN PRAGMATIC IDEALISM
If the security situation can at least be kept under control, the EU can revitalize its
long-term multilateral and bilateral relations with the countries in the five sub-
regions of its broader neighbourhood.
A multilateral forum would add value to bilateral relations, at least as a confidence
and security-building measure for the countries of each region, which often are
embroiled in tensions and disputes, but also to foster cooperation between sets of
countries on concrete issues. The more operational the multilateral forums can be
the better, of course, which requires a focused agenda. That certainly holds true for
the existing forums, the Eastern Partnership and the ill-fated Union for the Mediter-
ranean; with the participants of these the furthest-reaching bilateral relations, such
as association agreements, can be envisaged. Multilateral relations with the Gulf
countries, via the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), need to become more political.
For the Sahel and the Horn, European security initiatives in these regions can be the
starting point for less institutionalized but focussed multilateral meetings. In addi-
tion, ad hoc meetings in various constellations can be envisaged, including Iran, in
function of the issue to be addressed, e.g. the security crisis in Iraq.
At the bilateral level, a reconceptualization of relations is in order. Partnership is
indeed the aim, but it cannot be the starting point. Partnership at first sight does not
work. By declaring all neighbours to be partners from the start, the EU has weakened
rather than strengthened the incentive for reform. Why change if you are on the list
of the good guys already? Instead of changing its neighbours, the EU itself has
become tainted by associating itself too closely with unsavoury regimes. Real
partnership implies systematic consultation and regular joint action on an agreed
range of issues. That requires a degree of agreement on both values and policy objec-
tives which can be achieved with democracies and countries in transition but prob-
ably not with authoritarian regimes. The EU should of course have a dialogue with all
neighbours, starting from the realisation that in the absence of a membership
perspective and because the paternalistic conditionality approach no longer fits in
with this multipolar and post-Spring era, having a reforming role from the outside is
extremely difficult. Playing a moderating role, curbing excesses, is realistic and
important however, and can go hand in hand with issue-based cooperation on an ad
hoc basis, as a prelude to eventual partnership. This is what could be called prag-
matic idealism. When transition and democratization does happen, the EU can and
must of course offer full support. In such a scenario Europe has a comparative advan-
tage, for few other external actors can fully support democracy, in view of their own
lack of it.
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The east is the exception here, because as stated above it sees itself as a part rather
than as an object of Europe. This is a key reason why dynamics in the eastern neigh-
bourhood are very different and conditionality can work, though how far to the east
this applies may be doubted as well.
Within this context the EU should phase out the language of partnership, except
where it really applies. A return to classic diplomacy is in order, speaking with all
actors at all levels, privately but also publicly, in full view of public opinion in the
country. For this is our strongest asset throughout our broad neighbourhood: people
have become active citizens and will continue to exert pressure on their govern-
ments when they perceive their rights to be ignored. Once found, this “class
consciousness” cannot be put back in the bottle. Supporting free media and our own
public diplomacy are very important in this regard. Secondly, the EU has a lot of
expertise to offer (e.g. on security sector reform) and should be generous when it is
requested, especially in countries in transition. Thirdly, although other external
actors at times have more resources to spend and the scale of the challenges is
immense, the EU still can allocate significant budgets (e.g. €15 billion for the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Instrument for 2014-2020). Or at least they would be signifi-
cant if they were concentrated on more specific priorities rather than fragmented
across a wide array of well-intentioned but not always very effective initiatives. The
highest priority appears to be investment in economically viable projects that stimu-




As violence and foreign intrusion threaten the stability of many of Europe’s neigh-
bours, with full-blooded war going on in several countries, our broader neighbour-
hood certainly is in the worst state since a long time. But that does not mean that
Europe is impotent to deal with this. If we deploy them pragmatically, our diplomatic,
military, civilian and economic instruments, and indeed our values themselves, can
have a great impact. The key, as ever, is strategy: setting clear objectives and
choosing instruments and allocating means in function of those priorities. In the
simplest of terms: not just doing things with the neighbours, but doing things for a
purpose.
